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NOTES

The two words, "without more," were taken by the dissenters to mean that had
the defendant offered physical and forceful resistance to the blood alcohol test,
and had his resistance been overcome, the whole procedure to obtain the blood
sample would then be unconstitutional. In his dissent Mr. Chief Justice Warren
said:
"I cannot accept an analysis that would make physical resistance by a prisoner a prerequisite to the existence of his constitutional rights.' 34

Mr. Justice Douglas in a separate dissent stated that as he understood the decision
by the majority the ruling would have been the direct opposite if there had been
a struggle with the police. He was of the opinion that "the sanctity of the person
is equally violated... where the prisoner is incapable of offering resistance." 35
While it may remain an open question in other states whether the accused has
the right to resist the taking of his blood for an alcoholic content test, in California,
because of the Duroncelay decision, this question should be strongly answered in
the negative. The accused cannot refuse to submit to the blood taking on the
grounds of self-incrimination; he cannot refuse to submit on the grounds of violation of due process; nor can he refuse to submit on the grounds that the taking of
his blood would be an unreasonable search and seizure. May the accused refuse to
submit to any other lawful and reasonable search? Why, then, should he be allowed to resist the blood alcohol test?
The blood alcohol test is the most accurate of the chemically administered
tests to determine whether the accused is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.30 Its usefulness in reducing highway fatalities by detection of inebriated
drivers is plainly apparent. A statutory enactment to promulgate the legality of the
blood alcohol test, administered with or without consent, and to formally answer
the issue of whether an accused person can resist the test, would be desirable. Kansas has such a statute which might well be used as a model.3 7 It provides that anyone who operates a motor vehicle on public highways within the state shall be
deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of his breath, blood, urine or saliva
for the purpose of determining alcoholic content.
But regardless of whether or not the state legislature deems it desirable to pass
such a statute, the legality of the nonconsensual blood alcohol test is a dead issue
in California, and the case of People v. Duroncelay38 stands as notice to the driver
that his resistance to the blood alcohol test will not be looked upon with favor in

the state courts.
John A. Burke

TORTS: ARE

PUBLIC OFFIcIALs WHO CONSPIRE WITH OUTSIDERS ACTING
WITHIN TiE SCOPE OF THEIR AUTHORITY?

In order to assist them in the fearless performance of their duties and to protect
them from vexatious litigation, public officials are clothed with an immunity from
civil liability.1 Though the first class of officials to receive this protection was the
84 Id. at 441.
85 Id. at 443.
36 See note 1 supra.
37 KA.
GEN. STAT. § 8-1001 to § 8-1007 (1949 Supp. 1955).

38 48 Cal. 2d 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957).
1
PRossza, ToRTs § 109 (2d ed. 1955) ; HARPER, ToRTs § 298 (1933).
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judiciary,2 it has been extended to other public officers exercising discretionary
powers.3 A long line of cases point out that a public official will be protected by
this immunity even if he acts with malice and without probable cause. 4 However,
the act in question must be within the scope of the official's authority. Once he acts
beyond the scope of his authority, the cloak of immunity vanishes and he is subject to the same standard of liability as other citizens would be under similar circumstances." Though this "scope of authority" requirement is simply stated, its
application in particular cases can be very difficult.
In Hardy v. Vial,6 a recent California case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant public officials acted beyond the scope of their authority by conspiring
with outsiders and aiding them in the making and filing of affidavits containing
false charges against the plaintiff for the purpose of procuring his dismissal from
Long Beach State College, where he was employed as a professor. Four of the defendant public officials were affiliated with Long Beach State College and three
held official positions with the California State Department of Education. Following his dismissal from the college, the State Personnel Board ordered the plaintiff's
reinstatement after finding the charges against him untrue and the grounds for his
dismissal not sustained by the evidence. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced an
action for damages for malicious prosecution.
The Supreme Court of California had to determine whether public officials,
motivated by malice, are acting beyond the scope of their authority when they
conspire with outsiders and aid them in the making and filing of affidavits containing false charges against an innocent professor. In holding that the defendant officials did not act beyond the scope of their authority, the court said:
"The underlying theory of absolute immunity is equally applicable whether the employee acts by himself or with others who are not immune." 7

Four cases were relied upon by the court to support the above holding. In the
first case, White v. Brinkman,8 decided by a California District Court of Appeal,
the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, public officers and outsiders, maliciously
engaged in a conspiracy to injure the plaintiff in his business and social relations.
Though the court held that the public officials were protected by the immunity
rule, it did not discuss the question of whether a public official acts beyond the
scope of his authority when he conspires with outsiders. In the second case,
Yaselli v. Goff,9 the plaintiff complained that the defendant official with others
maliciously charged the plaintiff with conspiring to defraud the United States.
Other than mentioning the fact that the complaint stated that the defendant was
accused by the plaintiff of the alleged acts "with certain other defendants not now
2 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).

367 C.J.S., Officers § 127 (1950) ; 21 Cal. Jur., Public Officers § 90 (1925).
Phelps v. Dawson, 97 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1938) ; Cooper v. O'Connor, 99 F.2d 135 (D.C.
Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 643 (1938) ; White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 235 P.2d 209
(1951) ; 32 Cal. Jur. 2d, Malicious Prosecution § 8 (1956).
5 Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947) ; Stiles v. Morse, 223 Mass.
174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919) ; 43 Am. Jur., Public Officers § 277 (1942) ; 67 C.J.S. Officers § 126
4

(1950).

648 Cal.2d ........
,311 P.2d 494 (1957).
Id. at .........
311 P.2d at 497.
823 Cal. App.2d 307, 73 P.2d 254 (1937).
9 12 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1926).
7
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before this court," 10 the court did not discuss the fact that the defendant acted
with others in bringing the charges. In both cases, the particular officials involved
were shielded from liability by the immunity doctrine, but in neither case was
there any discussion or rule laid down as to whether an official goes beyond the
scope of his authority when he conspires with outsiders.
Hoppe v. Klapperich" was the third case relied on by the California Supreme
Court for its holding. Though the defendant officials in this case were found to
have acted beyond the scope of their authority on other grounds and were therefore liable, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that the immunity rule ".... is
not to be scuttled or avoided by pleading that the acts complained of resulted from
a conspiracy previously entered into."'12 But the case is weak authority since this
statement is apparently dicta for which no specific authority is cited by the Minnesota court. The last case cited by the California Supreme Court, Linder v. Foster,3
was clearly not in point since it involved public officials who conspired among
themselves and not with outsiders.' 4
When these cases are analyzed, it is found that only three of them have any
relation at all to the issue of conspiracy with outsiders, and two of these do not
even discuss, much less properly reason, the point for which they are cited as
authority by the California Supreme Court. The only case that discusses this point
at all, does so merely by way of dicta which is unsupported by authority. The
court might as easily have held that the officials in the Hardy case acted beyond
the scope of their authority by conspiring with outsiders and thus deprived themselves of the protection of the immunity doctrine. But the officials were shielded
from liability by the application of the immunity doctrine. If the holding is not
based upon strong case authority, then where does it find support?
The answer seems to be given in the following passage from Judge Learned
Hand's opinion in Gregoire v. Biddle15 which the court quoted with approval. In
commenting on the immunity rule, the judge states:
"In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than
to subject those who try to do their duty to the con8
stant dread of retaliation."'

But will all officers be subjected to "the constant dread of retaliation" if in cases
where a few conspire with outsiders these few are held liable? The answer is necessarily no, since only those who conspire with outsiders need fear being held liable.
The immunity doctrine is too well established to try to overthrow it, or, for that
matter, even to attack it. But its overthrow is not being advocated, nor is the doctrine as such being attacked, when it is suggested that in particularcases public
officials are to be deprived of its protection when they act beyond the scope of
their authority. A case like Hardy v. Vial, where public officials conspired with
outsiders, seems to be one of these special cases. The doctrine's protection has
1Old. at 397.

11224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
at 232, 28 N.W.2d at 788.
2Id.
Is 209 Minn. 43, 295 N.W. 299 (1940).
14 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Jones v. Kennedy, 121 F.2d 40 (D.C.
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 665 (1941) ; Fletcher v. Wheat, 100 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
15 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).

11d. at 581.
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always been denied to officials who act beyond the scope of their authority.' 7 The
California Supreme Court has recognized this limitation on the application of the
immunity doctrine.' 8 Hardy v. Vial seems to be a case which called for such a
limitation of the immunity rule.
When are officials deemed to be acting beyond the scope of their authority?
This query can best be answered by reference to a few illustrative cases. Where
the law grants authority to the members of a city council to remove from office
the city treasurer provided they proceed in accordance with the law regulating the
civil service, they are subject to liability as individuals for attempting a removal
without complying with the provisions of that law. 19 In such a case, they deprive
themselves of the shield of immunity by their failure to stay within the scope of
their authorized powers. Likewise, a municipal judge who is required by statute to
have a complaint reduced to writing and subscribed by the complainant before
issuing a warrant, is acting wholly beyond the scope of his authority by issuing a
warrant before these statutory requisites are fulfilled. 20 Where a county sheriff uses
a warrant for a purpose for which it was not designed (using it to extort property),
he is deemed to have acted entirely outside the scope of his authority and thus to
have deprived himself of the immunity which would have protected him if he executed the process for the purpose for which it was intended. 2' These cases illustrate
that officials must perform their authorized duties in accordance with and in a
manner intended by the authority under which they act.
Chief Justice Gibson, in writing the majority opinion in the Hardy case, stated:
"The alleged purpose of the conspiracy, and, accordingly, the purpose of the school
defendants in aiding the non-school defendants in making the affidavits, was to accomplish the dismissal of plaintiff from his employment. This purpose, of course, was
clearly within the scope of the official duties of the school defendants and within the
2
protection of the immunity rule."m

Certainly the duties of the school officials include weeding out those unfit to teach.
But they do not include procuring the dismissal of those qualified to teach. The
acts the officials were authorized to do were to be done by them singly or acting
together, but there was no authority whatsoever to do their particular duties in
concert with outsiders who had no connection with and for all purposes were complete strangers to the school and department. However, it is not denied that if such
officials severally or among themselves act with malicious motives and without
probable cause to procure the dismissal of a qualified instead of an unfit professor,
much authority can be cited to the effect that they are acting within the scope of
their authority and are under the protection of the immunity doctrine.23 But when
these same officials do the same acts in conspiracywith outsiders, they are not only
acting beyond the scope of their authority, but beyond any contemplation of authority. In such a case, they are neither performing their duties in accordance with
nor in a manner intended by the authority vested in them.
It was further argued by the learned Chief Justice that:
17 See note 5 supra.
18 White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 235 P.2d 209 (1951).
'9 Stiles v. Morse, 223 Mass. 174, 123 N.E. 615 (1919).
2
o Hoppe v. Klapperich, 224 Minn. 224, 28 N.W.2d 780 (1947).
21 Ibid.
22 48 Cal.2d ........ at ....... 311 P.2d at 497.
2

See note 4 supra.

